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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government owns vast amounts of land in Alaska and
the western states. Development and use of private lands adjacent to
federal lands often require access across federal lands. Where a road,
transmission line, pipeline, or other right-of-way would cross federal
land, the private developer must obtain permission from the federal
agency responsible for managing such land. Historically, the federal
land-managing agencies routinely granted such rights-of-way. Since
the advent of the environmental movement in the 1960's, however, a
number of impediments to securing access across federal lands have
arisen. This conflict between private property interests and environ-
mental concerns led Congress to enact special access guarantees and
procedures in the 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act ("ANILCA" or "Alaska Lands Act").'
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This article explores federal land access issues and focuses on
ANILCA's innovative access provisions. Part II provides a brief
background on the general law of access across federal lands and ex-
plains why access issues came to the forefront in ANILCA. In Parts
III-VI, this article describes in detail the Alaska Lands Act's access
provisions and transportation and utility system ("TUS") routing pro-
cedures, as implemented in a 1986 Department of the Interior ("Inte-
rior") rulemaking.2 Finally, Part VII addresses whether ANILCA's
access provisions should be legislatively extended to federal lands in
states other than Alaska. Thus, this article examines the extent to
which the lament that "you can't get there from here" holds true on
public lands in and outside Alaska.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE LAW OF ACCESS
ACROSS FEDERAL LANDS
The federal lands are managed by several agencies and for a vari-
ety of purposes. In general, each federal land-managing agency has its
own statute governing its land management responsibilities and its
ability to issue rights-of-way.
Three of the land-managing agencies are housed within Interior.
The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") administers the unre-
served public domain under the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 ("FLPMA"). 3 The National Park Service ("NPS") man-
ages those federal lands that have been reserved as part of the National
Park System under several statutes.4 The Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") manages the National Wildlife Refuge System under the Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act5 and related
authorities.
The Forest Service, an agency within the Department of Agricul-
ture, is the other major federal landowner. It administers the National
Forest System under several statutes. 6 Some NPS, FWS, BLM, and
2. See 51 Fed. Reg. 31,619 (1986). These ANILCA rules are now codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 36 (1986). Portions of these rules recently have been challenged in a suit
brought by environmental groups. See Trustees for Alaska v. United States Dep't of
the Interior, No. A87-055 (D. Alaska filed Feb. 9, 1987).
3. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Title V of the FLPMA
governs right-of-way issuance on BLM land. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1982).
Rights-of-way for oil and gas pipelines on BLM lands are governed by section 28 of
the Mineral Leasing Act. See 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-460 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1982).
6. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 471a-583i (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Rights-of-way
across Forest Service lands are generally governed by Title V of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1761-1771 (1982).
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Forest Service lands also have been placed in other conservation-ori-
ented land systems, such as the National Wilderness Preservation Sys-
tem7 and the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, 8 which can
further constrain access opportunities.
In general, through the mid-1900's, entry to areas surrounded by
federal lands ("inholdings") and rights-of-way across federal lands
were routinely granted either because such access was necessary to
meet development needs or because it was considered to be part of the
public's implied license to use federal lands.9 Since the advent of the
environmental movement in the 1960s, however, several factors have
combined to increase the difficulties in obtaining desired access across
federal lands.
First, the government has increasingly dedicated federal land to
conservation-oriented purposes. Federal law often significantly re-
stricts access and rights-of-way across lands in the National Park, Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge, and National Wilderness Preservation Systems.
For example, the Wilderness Act virtually precludes motorized access
or rights-of-way across lands in the National Wilderness Preservation
System ("Wilderness lands"). 10 The National Wildlife Refuge System
Administration Act permits the FWS to issue rights-of-way across
units of the National Wildlife Refuge System only when the rights-of-
way are "compatible" with wildlife refuge purposes.1 Within the Na-
tional Park System, the NPS may grant rights-of-way under a "public
interest" standard only for specified purposes (for example, transmis-
sion lines), and authority for some types of rights-of-way (for example,
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982).
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
9. See Buford v. Houtz, 13 U.S. 320 (1890); Coggins, Evans & Johnson, The
Law of Public Rangeland Management I: The Extent and Distribution of Federal
Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 589-93 (1982); Comment, Gamesmanship on the Checker-
board: The Recurring Problem of Access to Interlocked Public and Private Lands Lo-
cated Within the Pacific Railroad Land Grants, 17 LAND & WATER L. REv. 429, 432-
35 (1982).
10. The most significant access restriction in the Wilderness Act is section 4(c),
which provides that, as a general matter:
there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equip-
ment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical
transport, and no structure or installation within any such [Wilderness] area.
16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1982). Other access restrictions in the Wilderness Act appear at
16 U.S.C. sections 1133(d), 1134 (1982).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1) (1982). The National Wildlife Refuge System Ad-
ministration Act of 1966 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to grant easements
over Wildlife Refuge lands for:
powerlines, telephone lines, canals, ditches, pipelines, and roads... when-
ever he determines that such uses are compatible with the purposes for
which these areas are established.
16 U.S.C. § 668dd(1)(B) (1982).
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oil and gas pipelines) is lacking. 12 Other statutes that provide direc-
tion for the management of the federal conservation land systems also
contain provisions that severely constrain access opportunities in or-
der to protect conservation values. 13
Second, even on multiple use lands - such as BLM and Forest
Service lands - the issuance of rights-of-way has become more com-
plicated. The obligation to maintain wilderness values in wilderness
study lands until Congress has reviewed the lands for possible inclu-
sion in the National Wilderness Preservation System may preclude ac-
cess across federal roadless areas. 14 In addition, several federal
statutes mandate a more active role for the Forest Service and the
BLM in granting of rights-of-way.15 These agencies now often impose
environmental constraints, and they, rather than the private land de-
veloper, specify the appropriate access route. Finally, the granting of
rights-of-way across BLM and Forest Service lands under Title V of
FLPMA is discretionary; thus, there is no statutory assurance of
access. 16
Third, the 1979 Supreme Court decision in Leo Sheep Co. v.
United States17 arguably suggests that the doctrine of easements by
necessity does not apply to federal lands. Application of that doctrine
would require that the government grant access across federal lands to
the owner of land surrounded by federal lands. Leo Sheep addressed
the converse of the issue examined in this article: access across private
lands to reach federal lands. The private and federal lands were held
12. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 5, 79 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
13. For a general compilation of the access laws applicable on federal lands, see
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ANALYSIS OF LAWS GOVERNING AccESs
ACROSS FEDERAL LANDS - OPTIONS FOR ACCESS IN ALASKA (1979).
14. Section 3(b) of the Wilderness Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to
administer "primitive" areas of the National Forest System to preserve wilderness
values "until Congress has determined otherwise." 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (1982).
Section 603(c) of FLPMA mandates a similar wilderness study review for BLM
lands, and contains a corresponding directive "not to impair the suitability of such
areas for preservation as wilderness" until the conclusion of the review. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1782 (1982).
15. See Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (governing Forest Service land use plan-
ning); National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.) (governing Forest Service land
use planning); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 43 U.S.C.§§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (providing environmental responsibilities);
FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (governing BLM land use
planning).
16. See 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1982) (because the relevant Secretary is merely "au-
thorized to grant ... rights-of-way," access is not guaranteed).
17. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
[Vol. 4:1
1987] ANILCA'S INNOVATIONS IN LAW OF ACCESS 5
in a "checkerboard" land ownership pattern that resulted from a rail-
road land grant. Because of the checkerboard configuration, it was
physically impossible for the government to provide recreational ac-
cess to a reservoir on public lands without intruding on the plaintiff's
property. The plaintiff brought an action to quiet title against the fed-
eral government, which had built a road across the plaintiff's property
to access the reservoir. The government argued that it had a common
law easement by necessity across the plaintiff's property. 18 Rejecting
the government's claim, the Court found the applicability of the com-
mon law doctrine of easements by necessity "somewhat strained," pri-
marily because the government could rely upon its power of eminent
domain to gain access. The Court viewed the issue solely as one of
discerning congressional intent in enacting the original federal land
grant statute.19 A unanimous Court held that the federal government
had no statutorily implied right of recreational access across the pri-
vate lands. While the "tea leaves" of Leo Sheep are somewhat uncer-
tain concerning the access rights of a private party across federal
lands, the case can be read to suggest that the doctrine of easements by
necessity does not apply against the federal government and that ac-
cess rights should be implied only to the extent consistent with con-
gressional intent in enacting land grant legislation.20
Fourth, the United States Attorney General has opined that in-
holders have no guarantee of access across federal lands. On June 23,
1980, the Attorney General, Benjamin Civiletti, issued an opinion con-
cerning the access rights of Burlington Northern, Inc. across a wilder-
ness study area in a national forest in Montana.21 The lands discussed
in the Civiletti opinion, like those in Leo Sheep, were held in a check-
erboard ownership pattern of alternating federal and private lands as a
result of a railroad land grant to Burlington Northern's predecessor in
title. Relying in part on the exclusive congressional authority under
the property clause22 to dispose of federal land interests, and adopting
the position that the Court had perhaps implicitly accepted in Leo
Sheep, the Civiletti opinion concluded that the common law doctrine
18. Id. at 677-79.
19. Id. at 681-82.
20, It can be argued that Leo Sheep - by phrasing the easement by necessity
doctrine in terms of transactions among "private landowner[s]" and by ultimately
finding "the intent of Congress" to be determinative - obliquely confirmed that there
are no easements of necessity across federal lands and that private access rights can be
implied only when access was intended by Congress. Id. at 679, 681.
21. Rights-of-Way Across Nat'l Forests, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 30 (1980).
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, which provides in part:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States ....
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of easements by necessity does not operate on federal lands.23 Instead,
the Civiletti opinion stated that an inholder must base an access claim
on statutory authority. The Attorney General suggested that, in par-
ticular circumstances, inholders may have access rights implied under
federal land grant statutes. The opinion, however, provided conflict-
ing rules of statutory interpretation for discerning the existence of
such implied access rights. 24 The Attorney General suggested that, in
the absence of an implied statutory access right, there is no true guar-
antee of access across federal lands; the inholder would be subject to
agency discretion in authorizing access under Title V of FLPMA or
other federal law. The opinion apparently still controls the federal
litigating position.
Finally, the government has used its discretionary authority to
grant or deny access to regulate indirectly the development of
nonfederal lands. Relying on the purported power to deny any access,
several federal agencies have asserted the lesser power to condition
access to allow development only when it is consistent with the uses of
23. "It is also my view that the common law doctrine of easement by necessity
does not apply to congressional disposition of the public domain." Rights-of-Way
Across Nat'l Forests, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 30, 39 (1980).
The common law doctrine of easements by necessity seems to have two main
variants: one which infers an easement across lands originally held under unity of title
only where the parties to the severance document appear to have contemplated access,
and one which is a judicial fiction implying access in all severance situations to favor
the productive use of lands, regardless of party intent. Compare 3 R. POWELL & P.
ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 410 (1986) with 3 H. TIFFANY, LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 793 (3d ed. 1939 & Supp. 1986). In effect, the implied statutory
access theory adopted by the Civiletti opinion may be parallel to the first variant of
easements by necessity.
24. See Rights-of-Way Across Nat'l Forests, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 30, 41-42 (1980).
The Attorney General stated:
To determine what rights have passed under federal law, it is necessary to
interpret the statute disposing of the land. It is a recognized principle that
all federal grants must be construed in favor of the government "lest they be
enlarged to include more than what was expressly included. .. " In all
cases, the intent of Congress must control.
These general rules must not be applied to defeat the intent of Congress,
however. The Supreme Court has stated that public grants are "not to be
construed as to defeat the intent of the legislature, or to withhold what is
given either expressly or by necessary or fair implication".... These rules
dictate that if it is clear that Congress intended to grant access, such access
must be acknowledged, its scope consistent with the purposes for which the
grant was made. An implied easement defined by the actual intent of Con-
gress must be distinguished from an easement by necessity, which relies on a
presumed intent of the parties.
Id. (citations and footnotes deleted).
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surrounding federal land.25 This access "handle" often supplies an ef-
fective substitute for the regulation of development where Congress
has not granted direct federal regulatory authority over private lands.
Such regulation often results in diminished development expectations.
As these impediments have arisen and shaped existing access law,
a corresponding concern has grown among private landowners and
users that they could become landlocked by federal lands without ac-
cess to their private lands. In many situations involving federal lands
in western states, it may not be possible "to get there from here" satis-
factorily because of the substantive limits and administrative discre-
tion embodied in statutory access provisions applicable to federal
lands. Congress responded to these concerns by including in
ANILCA a variety of unique and revolutionary access-related
provisions.26
ANILCA became the focal point for innovations in access law for
several reasons. In terms of acreage, ANILCA is the most significant
federal conservation measure ever enacted. ANILCA added nearly
104 million acres of "conservation system units" ("CSUs") 2 7 in
Alaska - thereby doubling the size of the National Park and National
Wildlife Refuge Systems, and tripling the size of the National Wilder-
ness Preservation System.28 Congress recognized that existing law
"allows only limited public access" across the massive CSUs, and en-
acted specific access guarantees to ensure "full rights of access" for
CSU inholders.2 9 Also recognizing that Alaska's "existing transporta-
tion and utility systems are in their embryonic stage of development,"
25. For example, 36 C.F.R. subpt. 9B (1986) controls the development of non-
federally owned oil and gas rights within the National Park System based on access
across federal lands.
26. In enacting the ANILCA Title XI access provisions, the Senate and House
Committees stated that they did "not agree with the arguments that existing law is
sufficient"; therefore, they enacted Title XI "which supersedes rather than supple-
ments existing law." S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 245-46 (1979); H.R. REP.
No. 97, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 237-38 (1979).
27. The term "conservation system unit" is defined in ANILCA § 102(4) to
mean:
any unit in Alaska of the National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge
System, National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, National Trails System,
National Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest Monument
including existing units, units established, designated, or expanded by or
under the provisions of this Act, additions to such units, and any such unit
established, designated, or expanded hereafter.
16 U.S.C. § 3102(4) (1982).
28. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATUS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES' IM-
PLEMENTATION OF THE ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS CONSERVATION ACT
(1982).
29. S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1979).
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Congress provided for Alaska's economic growth by adopting "a pro-
cedure for future siting of transportation facilities ... which super-
sedes rather than supplements existing law when such systems cross
CSU lands."' 30 Finally, Congress enacted specific access guarantees
across BLM and Forest Service lands "to resolve any lingering ques-
tions by making it clear that non-Federal landowners have a right of
access.,
31
This article categorizes the ANILCA access-related provisions
for analysis as follows: (1) access guarantees across CSUs (ANILCA
sections 1110(a), 1110(b), 1111); (2) access guarantees across National
Forest System and BLM-managed public lands (ANILCA sections
1323(a), 1323(b)); and (3) procedures and approval standards for
transportation or utility systems (ANILCA sections 1101 through
1107). The sections below discuss the scope of these provisions and
significant implementing actions.
III. ACCESS GUARANTEES ACROSS CONSERVATION
SYSTEM UNITS
A. ANILCA Section 1110(a) - Traditional, Non-Environmentally
Damaging Access
ANILCA section 1110(a) is the only ANILCA access provision
that does not require a permit for access; it authorizes certain access
methods in CSUs unless and until prohibited by administrative ac-
tion.32 This provision allows the use of snowmachines, motorboats,
airplanes, and nonmotorized surface transportation methods such as
dog sleds and horses in CSUs and other named areas for "traditional
30. Id. at 245-46.
31. Id. at 310.
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 3170(a) (1983). ANILCA section 1110(a) provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or other law, the Secretary
shall permit, on conservation system units, national recreation areas, and
national conservation areas, and those public lands designated as wilderness
study, the use of snowmachines (during periods of adequate snow cover, or
frozen river conditions in the case of wild and scenic rivers), motorboats,
airplanes, and nonmotorized surface transportation methods for traditional
activities (where such activities are permitted by this Act or other law) and
for travel to and from villages and homesites. Such use shall be subject to
reasonable regulations by the Secretary to protect the natural and other val-
ues of the conservation system units, national recreation areas, and national
conservation areas, and shall not be prohibited unless, after notice and hear-
ing in the vicinity of the affected unit or area, the Secretary finds that such
use would be detrimental to the resource values of the unit or area. Nothing
in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the use of other methods of
transportation for such travel and activities on conservation system lands
where such use is permitted by this Act or other law.
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activities" and for travel to and from villages and homesites. The pro-
vision's legislative history reflects a congressional intent to authorize
generally the use of these access methods, which require no permanent
improvements on federal lands and cause little environmental injury. 33
In its 1986 rulemaking, Interior uniformly implemented and ex-
panded upon ANILCA section 1110(a) access rights for all NPS and
FWS lands and certain BLM lands (for example, wilderness study
lands) in Alaska.3 4 These rules broaden the statutory access guarantee
by allowing the use of motorboats, airplanes, and nonmotorized sur-
face transportation methods for any purpose on most Interior lands
covered by section 1110(a).3 5 No corresponding regulations have been
issued for Forest Service lands that are subject to ANILCA section
1110(a). Consequently, the statutory limitation that access must be
for "traditional activities" or "travel to and from villages and home-
sites" presently remains a potential hurdle with respect to the use of
33. The Committee recommends that traditional uses be allowed to con-
tinue .... If uses were generally occurring in the area prior to its designa-
tion, those uses shall be allowed to continue and no proof of pre-existing use
will be required....
The adverse environmental impacts associated with these transporta-
tion modes are not as significant as for roads, pipelines, railroads, etc. both
because no permanent facilities are required and because the transportation
vehicles cannot carry into the country large numbers of individuals.
S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1979).
34. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.11 (1986). Prior to the uniform rulemaking in 43 C.F.R.
section 36.11, the National Park Service (NPS) and the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) had adopted similar rules on an interim basis. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 13.11-.13
(1982) (NPS); 50 C.F.R. § 36.21 (1982) (FWS). These interim rules were superseded
by the 1986 rulemaking. The preamble material on the interim rules, and on the re-
codification of the uniform Interior rules, provides much useful information on how
Interior construes ANILCA's access guarantees. See 51 Fed. Reg. 31,619, 31,626-28
(1986) (Interior's final uniform rulemaking); 48 Fed. Reg. 32,506 (1983) (Interior's
proposed uniform rulemaking); 46 Fed. Reg. 31,827 (1981) (NPS and FWS interim
rulemaking).
35. Interior eliminated the statutory limitations to access for traditional activities
and for homesite travel, reasoning that: (1) the agency "has the discretion to broaden
the authorization beyond that required in the statute"; (2) a general use authorization
"would not be in derogation of the [CSU] values"; and (3) a general use authorization
"would provide for greater enjoyment of these areas by visitors." 51 Fed. Reg. 31,619,
31,626 (1986).
Several environmental groups have challenged Interior's expansion of ANILCA
section 1 10(a) access rights in Trustees for Alaska v. United States Department of
the Interior, No. A87-055 (D. Alaska filed Feb. 9, 1987). The suit alleges that 43
C.F.R. section 36.11 violates ANILCA section 1110(a) by not restricting access to
particular areas where "traditional activities" occurred and by not restricting access to
the traditionally employed modes of access (e.g., dog sled).
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snowmachines on Interior lands, 36 and with respect to all ANILCA
section 1110(a) access methods on Forest Service lands. 37
While ANILCA section 1110(a) provides a "floor" of guaranteed
access in CSUs and related areas, two constraints render the section an
incomplete access guarantee. First, ANILCA section 1110(a) does not
appear to authorize the construction or maintenance of improvements
such as landing strips, docking facilities, and roads, which may be nec-
essary for use of the permissible access methods. 38 Second, the limited
access methods authorized by ANILCA section 1110(a) do not in-
clude the use of off-road vehicles (other than snowmachines), which
often are a preferred means of access in the absence of improvements.
In national parks, wildlife refuges, and BLM wilderness study areas in
Alaska, the regulations allow off-road vehicle use only by permit or
after a general opening of an area to off-road vehicle use. 39
B. ANILCA Section 1110(b) - Access to Inholdings
In ANILCA section 1110(b), Congress provided the major access
guarantee for CSU inholders. This provision obligates the government
to permit "adequate and feasible access" to qualified inholders.40 The
36. The 1986 Interior rulemaking retains the limitation of ANILCA section
1110(a) that access is allowed only "for traditional activities" or "for travel to and
from villages and homesites and other valid occupancies" only when snowmachines
are used. 43 C.F.R. § 36.11(c) (1986). These limitations on access purposes do not
apply when motorboats, nonmotorized surface transportation, or fixed-wing aircraft
are used. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.11(d)-(f) (1986).
37. As implemented, ANILCA section 1110(a) provides access rights in Alaska
national parks and wildlife refuges superior to those available in similar areas outside
Alaska. Airplane and snowmachine access ordinarily are significantly restricted in
national parks, see 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.17-.18 (1986), and wildlife refuges, see 50 C.F.R.
§§ 27.31, .34, 35.5 (1986), outside of Alaska. For example, aircraft landings are gen-
erally precluded in national parks, see 36 C.F.R. § 2.17 (1986), and wildlife refuges,
see 50 C.F.R. § 27.34 (1986), outside Alaska.
38. Legislative history arguably suggests that ANILCA section 1110(a) access
rights do not include the right to construct permanent improvements. See supra note
33. Most permanent improvements, such as landing strips, appear to qualify as trans-
portation or utility systems ("TUS") under ANILCA section 1102(4) (1982). See 16
U.S.C. § 3162(4) (1982). Consequently, persons probably may construct such im-
provements only by complying with the TUS procedures set out in 16 U.S.C. sections
3161-3167 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 84-130.
39. Interior could not generally open its Alaska lands to off-road vehicle
("ORV") use due to the ORV restrictions contained in Executive Order No. 11,644.
See Exec. Order No. 11,644, 3 C.F.R. 666 (1971-1975), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
app. at 510-11 (1982). The regulations allow ORV use only: (1) on established roads
or parking areas; (2) in additional areas designated in accordance with the procedures
of Executive Order No. 11,644; and (3) in additional areas by a permit issued under 43
C.F.R. sections 36.10 or 36.12 or by a permit issued upon a finding that ORV use
would be compatible with the purposes of the CSU. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.1 l(g) (1986).
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 3170(b) (1982). ANILCA section 1110(b) provides:
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scope of ANILCA section 1110(b) can be analyzed by answering two
questions: (1) Who is a qualified inholder? (2) What is the level of the
access entitlement?
To qualify for access under ANILCA section 1110(b), a person
must hold: (1) title to a nonfederal land interest, including surface or
subsurface rights; (2) a valid mining claim, whether patented or unpat-
ented under the 1872 Mining Law4 1; or (3) a "valid occupancy" inter-
est, such as a lease or permit from a federal or nonfederal landowner.42
In addition, the land interest must be either a true "inholding" com-
pletely surrounded by a CSU, or private land "effectively surrounded"
by a CSU and "physical barriers."'43 ANILCA section 1110(b) is si-
lent as to whether the provision guarantees access only from the
boundary of the CSU to the inholding, or whether it also creates a
right to access across adjacent Forest Service and BLM lands to reach
a CSU inholding.44
Interior's 1986 rulemaking interpreted the level of access entitle-
ment. According to Interior, the ANILCA section 1110(b) guarantee
of "adequate and feasible access" means:
a route and method of access that is shown to be reasonably neces-
sary and economically practicable, but not necessarily the least
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act or other law, in any case in
which State owned or privately owned land, including subsurface rights of
such owners underlying public lands, or a valid mining claim or other valid
occupancy is within or is effectively surrounded by one or more conservation
system units, national recreation areas, national conservation areas, or those
public lands designated as wilderness study, the State or private owner or
occupier shall be given by the Secretary such rights as may be necessary to
assure adequate and feasible access for economic and other purposes to the
concerned land by such State or private owner or occupier and their succes-
sors in interest. Such rights shall be subject to reasonable regulations issued
by the Secretary to protect the natural and other values of such lands.
Id. In contrast, CSU inholders outside of Alaska do not have this absolute assurance
of access. See supra notes 10-24 and accompanying text.
41. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (current version codified in scattered
sections of 30 U.S.C.).
42. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.10(a)(4) (1986). The rulemaking preamble makes it clear
that the holder of a "valid leasehold" (e.g., an oil and gas lease) qualifies for access
rights under ANILCA section Il10(b). 51 Fed. Reg. 31,619, 31,625 (1986).
43. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.10(a)(3), (4) (1986).
44. In 43 C.F.R. section 36.1(a), Interior arguably takes the position that
ANILCA section 1110(b) applies only "within any conservation system unit." See 43
C.F.R. § 36.1(a) (1986). This issue could become significant. If ANILCA section
1110(b) guarantees to inholders access only from the CSU boundary, there might not
be assurance of access across adjacent BLM and Forest Service lands. ANILCA sec-
tion 1323 might not assure CSU inholders access across such adjacent lands because it
applies to BLM and national forest inholders; a CSU inholder might not qualify. This
could frustrate the legislative intent that ANILCA section 1110(b) ensure access, and
might require that the provision be read to encompass access rights across adjacent
lands in appropriate cases.
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costly alternative for achieving the use and development by the ap-
plicant on the applicant's nonfederal land or occupancy interest.45
This regulatory definition has several interesting ramifications, which
are discussed below.
First, as the rulemaking preamble clarifies, Interior has defined
the nebulous ANILCA section 1110(b) concept of "access" in terms of
any right-of-way necessary to permit development of the inholding,
including rights-of-way for roads, pipelines, and transmission lines.46
This interpretation represents a significant change from that of Inte-
rior's now rescinded, interim rulemaking, which defined access solely
in terms of "pedestrian or vehicular transportation" and which
thereby excluded a guarantee for pipelines and transmission lines.47
Under Interior's current view, section 1110(b) becomes an all-encom-
passing guarantee that Interior will grant an inholder any type of
right-of-way necessary for desired development.
Second, the regulatory definition seems to make the inholder vir-
tually the sole arbiter of the desired type and level of development of
his nonfederal land interest. The regulations obligate the federal gov-
ernment to permit "economically practicable" access commensurate
with the "development [intended] by the applicant. ' 48 This result ap-
pears to flow from ANILCA section 103(c), 49 which arguably prohib-
its direct federal regulation of inholdings, and ANILCA section
45. 43 C.F.R. § 36.10(a)(1) (1986).
46. Interior intends to apply ANILCA section 1110(b) to requests for "pipelines
or transmission lines," since "the statute clearly states that the access right is for 'eco-
nomic and other purposes' not merely for ingress and egress." 51 Fed. Reg. 31,619,
31,624 (1986). Several environmental groups have alleged that 43 C.F.R. section
36.10 is unlawful because it is not limited to personal ingress and egress. See Trustees
for Alaska v. United States Dep't of the Interior, No. A87-055 (D. Alaska filed Feb. 9,
1987). This suit also challenges other aspects of the section 36.10 rule.
47. The prior and now rescinded definition of access as solely "pedestrian or ve-
hicular transportation" appears at 36 C.F.R. section 13.1(a) (1982) (NPS) and 50
C.F.R. section 36.2(a) (1982) (FWS). In this superseded interim rulemaking, the NPS
and FWS had stated that non-vehicular rights-of-way for pipelines and transmission
lines were not within the scope of the ANILCA section 1110(b) access guarantee:
If the permanent improvement is not required as part of the applicant's right
to adequate and feasible access to an inholding (e.g., pipeline, transmission
line), the permit granting standards of Sections 1104-1107 of ANILCA shall
apply.
36 C.F.R. § 13.15(c)(2)(ii) (1982); 50 C.F.R. § 36.23(c)(2)(ii) (1982).
48. 43 C.F.R. § 36.10(a)(1) (1986).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c) (1982). ANILCA section 103(c) provides:
Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation system unit
which are [federally owned lands] ... shall be deemed to be included as a
portion of such unit. No lands which, before, on, or after [the date of enact-
ment of this Act], are conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation, or
to any private party shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely to
public lands within such units.
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1110(b), which arguably prohibits indirect regulation of inholding de-
velopment through access controls. These two sections leave Interior
with no discretion to deny access to a qualified inholder, or to tailor
access so as to interfere with the intended use or development of the
inholding. This means that ANILCA section 1110(b) likely ensures
access for anything from a small wilderness cabin to a large scale min-
eral, timber, or housing development. The implementing Interior reg-
ulations strive to provide to the inholder his desired route and method
of access. If the appropriate agency makes certain findings, however,
the agency may substitute another form or route of adequate and feasi-
ble access.5 0
The 1986 Interior regulations also elucidate the relationship be-
tween the guarantee of inholder access in ANILCA section 1110(b)
and the procedures for obtaining federal approval of a TUS in
ANILCA sections 1101 through 1107. Congress did not clarify
whether section 1110(b) or sections 1101 through 1107 should govern
when the access route desired by a qualified section 11 10(b) applicant
also constitutes a TUS under section 1102(4). Under the regulations,
an applicant for access under section 1110(b) must comply with the
procedures of section 1104 by filing a consolidated application request-
ing access, and by submitting to expedited National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA") compliance procedures and agency decisions to
evaluate the access proposal.51 These regulations, however, do accord
better treatment to the qualified ANILCA section 1110(b) applicant
Id.
50. The Interior regulations provide that the appropriate federal agency shall:
(e)(1)... permit the route(s) and method(s) across the area(s) desired by the
applicant, unless it is determined that:
(i) The route or method of access would cause significant adverse impacts
on natural or other values of the [federal land] area and adequate and feasi-
ble access otherwise exists; or
(ii) The route or method of access would jeopardize public health and
safety and adequate and feasible access otherwise exists; or
(iii) The route or method is inconsistent with the management plan(s) for
the [federal] area or purposes for which the area was established and ade-
quate and feasible access otherwise exists; or
(iv) The method is unnecessary to accomplish the applicant's land use
objective.
(2) If the appropriate Federal agency makes one of the findings described
in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, another alternative route(s) and/or
method(s) of access that will provide the applicant adequate and feasible
access shall be specified by that Federal agency ....
43 C.F.R. § 36.10(e) (1986).
Thus, these regulations seem to assert the authority to change not only the route,
but also the method (e.g., ORV to airplane), of desired access to protect federal re-
source values, so long as the access remains economically practicable and adequate.
51. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.10(c), (d) (1986).
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than to the ordinary TUS applicant, who has no assurance that Inte-
rior will grant access.: 2 The rules relieve the qualified ANILCA sec-
tion 1110(b) applicant from the obligation to comply with the
remaining procedures in sections 1101 through 1107, and ensure that
such an applicant will receive a permit for "adequate and feasible ac-
cess" from the federal agency at the end of the administrative pro-
cess.53 Thus, as discussed below, the regulations appear to implement
faithfully the guarantee of access in section 1110(b) and to interpret
reasonably the disparate commands of sections 1101 through 1107 and
section 11 10(b)5 4
C. ANILCA Section 1111 - Temporary Access
While ANILCA section 1110(b) accords inholders guaranteed ac-
cess within CSUs, section 1111 provides a "private landowner" with
temporary access across CSUs and related areas for "survey, geophysi-
cal, exploratory or other temporary uses" of nonfederal lands.55 Un-
like ANILCA section 1110(b), which provides absolute assurance of
access to both "owners and occupiers," the regulations implementing
section 1111 allow temporary access only where it does not require
"permanent facilities" and "will not result in permanent harm to the
resources of" the federal lands.56 Section 1111 also does not expressly
authorize access for lessees and permittees. Thus, the conclusion of
the implementing Interior regulations that ANILCA section 1110(b)
provides access rights superior to those provided by section 1111 when
52. See infra text accompanying notes 106-16.
53. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.10(e)(1) (1986).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 121-29.
55. See 16 U.S.C. § 3171 (1982). ANILCA section 1111 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Act or other law the Secre-
tary shall authorize and permit temporary access by the State or a private
landowner to or across any conservation system unit, national recreation
area, national conservation area, the National Petroleum Reserve - Alaska
or those public lands designated as wilderness study or managed to maintain
the wilderness character or potential thereof, in order to permit the State or
private landowner access to its land for purposes of survey, geophysical, ex-
ploratory, or other temporary uses thereof whenever he determines such ac-
cess will not result in permanent harm to the resources of such unit, area,
Reserve or lands.
(b) In providing temporary access pursuant to subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, the Secretary may include such stipulations and conditions he deems
necessary to insure that the private use of public lands is accomplished in a
manner that is not inconsistent with the purposes for which the public lands
are reserved and which insures that no permanent harm will result to the
resources of the unit, area, Reserve or lands.
Id.
56. 43 C.F.R. § 36.12(a), (d) (1986). Certain aspects of the section 36.12 rule
implementing ANILCA section 1111 have been challenged in Trustees for Alaska v.
United States Department of the Interior, No. A87-055 (D. Alaska filed Feb. 9, 1987).
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both sections apply seems well founded.5 7 This relationship may
render section 1111 a relatively unimportant access provision that
proves useful only when the applicant is not a CSU inholder and seeks
access completely across a CSU.
IV. GUARANTEED AccEsS TO INHOLDINGS WrrHIN THE
NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM AND BLM-MANAGED
PUBLIC LANDS
In substantially identical language, subsections (a) and (b) of
ANILCA section 1323 assure adequate access to inholdings located
within the National Forest System and BLM-managed public lands,
respectively. 58 Neither the Forest Service nor the BLM has promul-
gated regulations implementing section 1323.
A. The Level of Assured Access Under ANILCA Section 1323
ANILCA section 1323 obligates the relevant agency to provide
access that is "adequate to secure ... reasonable use" to an "owner"
of land surrounded by Forest Service or BLM land. The level of ac-
cess that is "adequate" would appear to vary with the level of "reason-
able" development. The agency likely can prescribe less
environmentally deleterious access routes and methods, so long as it
provides economically practicable access. Like the access rights pro-
vided by section 1110(b), the access rights provided by section 1323
presumably include the right to construct permanent access improve-
ments (for example, roads, landing strips, and bridges) on federal
lands in appropriate cases.
57. State and private landowners meeting the criteria of § 36.10(b) [the reg-
ulation implementing ANILCA § 1110(b)] are directed to use the proce-
dures of § 36.10 to obtain temporary access.
43 C.F.R. § 36.12(b) (1986).
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 3210 (1982). ANILCA section 1323 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and subject to such terms
and conditions as the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe, the Secretary
shall provide such access to nonfederally owned land within the boundaries
of the National Forest System as the Secretary deems adequate to secure to
the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof: Provided, That such
owner comply with rules and regulations applicable to ingress and egress to
or from the National Forest System.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and subject to such terms
and conditions as the Secretary of Interior may prescribe, the Secretary shall
provide such access to non-federally owned land surrounded by public lands
managed by the Secretary under the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1701-82) as the Secretary deems adequate to secure
to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof: Provided, That such
owner comply with rules and regulations applicable to access across public
lands.
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Compared with ANILCA section 1110(b), section 1323 is more
ambiguous as to whether the inholder is the sole arbiter of his desired
development. Because section 1323 guarantees only "reasonable use
and enjoyment" of an inholding, the relevant federal land manager
arguably retains the discretion to declare a proposed development ac-
tivity "unreasonable" due to its inconsistency with surrounding fed-
eral land use and thereby to refuse to grant sufficient access for the
proposed development. It remains to be seen whether the Forest Ser-
vice or the BLM will assert this authority.
Additionally, ANILCA section 1323 employs the same inexact
term "access" found in section 1110(b). Interior has interpreted ac-
cess under section 1110(b) comprehensively to include all rights-of-
way needed for development, such as rights-of-way for pipelines,
transmission lines, and the like.5 9 It remains unclear, however,
whether the agencies will construe section 1323 similarly. The Forest
Service might attempt to interpret section 1323(a) differently to in-
clude only personal transportation rights because the provision, unlike
sections 1110(b) and 1323(b), refers to the landowner's access for "in-
gress and egress." '60
B. The Geographic Scope of Section 1323
The geographic scope of ANILCA section 1323 has received
more attention than the nature of its access rights. In Montana Wil-
derness Association v. United States Forest Service, 61 the Ninth Circuit
held that ANILCA section 1323(a) assures access to inholdings within
the National Forest System nationwide.
The Montana Wilderness Association litigation arose in 1979,
when environmental groups challenged the Forest Service's grant of a
permit to Burlington Northern, Inc. to construct a logging road across
federal lands in the Gallatin National Forest in Montana to gain ac-
cess to Burlington Northern's timberlands (originally received as a
railroad land grant). The road would have defeated the wilderness
study protection provided by the Montana Wilderness Study Act of
1977.62 After the plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order
barring action under the permit, the Forest Service suspended the per-
mit and submitted the question of Burlington Northern's access rights
59. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
60. See 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (1982).
61. 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). The case is
discussed in Comment, Wilderness Values and Access Rights: Troubling Statutory
Construction Brings the Alaska Lands Act Into Play, 54 U. COLo. L. REv. 593 (1983).
62. Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-150, 91 Stat. 1243
(1977). Wilderness areas are, by definition, roadless. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131(c),
1133(c) (1982).
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to the Attorney General.63 This resulted in the Civiletti opinion dis-
cussed above, which rejected the Forest Service's arguments that the
common law doctrine of easements by necessity applies to federal
lands, and which found that Burlington Northern had no express stat-
utory access rights.64 The Forest Service then reinstated the access
permit on the grounds that, in accordance with the implied statutory
access rights theory of the Attorney General, an access right should be
implied under the land grant.65
In 1980, the district court held that Burlington Northern was en-
titled to access across the Gallatin National Forest under either an
easement by necessity theory or an implied statutory access theory.66
The parties then cross-appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In its first opin-
ion, the court rejected the Forest Service's argument that section
1323(a) of the recently enacted ANILCA applies outside the State of
Alaska and thus guarantees access to Burlington Northern.67 The first
Ninth Circuit opinion also reversed the district court's holding that
Burlington Northern had implied statutory and easement by necessity
access rights. Burlington Northern was left without its desired
access.
68
Following a motion for reconsideration by the government, the
Ninth Circuit reversed itself and vacated its earlier opinion. The court
held that, despite the provision's incongruous placement in the Alaska
Lands Act, ANILCA section 1323(a) applies to the National Forest
System "nation-wide" and provides a statutory guarantee of access. 69
63. Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 655 F.2d at 953.
64. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
65. Former Attorney General Civiletti construed the statutory provision under
which the permit had been granted (16 U.S.C. § 478) literally to grant access rights
across National Forest System lands only to "actual settlers." See Rights-of-Way
Across Nat'l Forests, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 30, 31-39 (1980).
66. See Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880
(D. Mont. 1980).
67. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., No. 80-3374 (9th
Cir. May 14, 1981), withdrawn, 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981). The court stated: "We
hold that § 1323 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act is limited to
the State of Alaska, and so has no relevance to this case." Id.
68. On the implied statutory access rights theory, the Ninth Circuit opined that
private access rights in the railroad land grant checkerboard was the "flip side of Leo
Sheep" and, since the government has no implied access rights over private lands, "no
reciprocal rights" should be granted to private parties. Id. The court viewed the ease-
ment by necessity doctrine as allowing only access that "is consistent with the intent
of the sovereign" and, since it had previously concluded that Congress had intended
no implied access in enacting the railroad land grant statute, the court held that "Bur-
lington Northern does not have an easement by necessity across federal land to its
inholding." Id.
69. Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 655 F.2d at 957. This conclusion that ANILCA
section 1323(a) applies outside of Alaska may be called into question by the dictum in
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Thus, at least with respect to the states within the Ninth Circuit,
ANILCA section 1323(a) currently provides a minimum assurance of
access that applies to National Forest System lands outside of Alaska.
Although the question of the nationwide scope of section 1323(a) is
clouded by conflicting legislative history, the Ninth Circuit's resolu-
tion seems correct, particularly given the Forest Service's endorsement
of that position.70
The court in Montana Wilderness Association did not address two
significant issues. First, the second Ninth Circuit opinion expressly
left open the issue of whether ANILCA section 1323(a), which pur-
ports to require access within the National Forest System
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law," governs access over
national forest lands that have been designated as part of the National
Wilderness Preservation System. 71 Sections 4(c) and 5(a) of the Wil-
derness Act contain access restrictions that arguably are as controlling
as ANILCA section 1323(a) purports to be.72 Although the issue of
a recent Supreme Court opinion that "provisions of ANILCA... need not be ex-
tended beyond the State of Alaska in order to effectuate their apparent purposes." See
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 55 U.S.L.W. 4355, 4361 (March 24, 1987).
70. The legislative history of ANILCA section 1323(a) is developed at length in
Montana Wilderness Association, 655 F.2d at 955-57. Senator John Melcher of Mon-
tana, the sponsor of ANILCA section 1323, and certain other Congressmen intimately
involved in the development of ANILCA, thought that ANILCA section 1323 ap-
plied nationwide. Those who disagreed included Representative Morris Udall, Chair-
man of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs which reported
ANILCA, until he changed his mind in voting for the conference report quoted infra
note 73. The Forest Service's interpretation that ANILCA section 1323(a) applies
nationwide arguably should govern given that courts accord great deference to the
contemporaneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute urged by the implementing
agency. See, e.g., Udall v. Talman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
71. The court stated: "We recognize a facial problem or tension between 1323(a)
and a portion of § 5(a) of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1134(a). We need not
decide in this case whether there is repeal by implication." Montana Wilderness Ass'n,
655 F.2d at 957 n.12.
72. Section 4(c) of the Wilderness Act provides:
Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, and subject to existing
private rights, there shall be ... no permanent road within any wilderness
area designated by this chapter and, except as necessary to meet minimum
requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of this chap-
ter..., there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motor-
ized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of
mechanical transport, and no structure or installation within any such area.
16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1982).
Section 5(a) of the Wilderness Act provides:
In any case where State-owned or privately owned land is completely sur-
rounded by national forest lands within areas designated by this chapter as
wilderness, such State or private owner shall be given such rights as may be
necessary to assure adequate access.., or the State-owned land or privately
owned land shall be exchanged for federally owned land ....
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the supremacy of either ANILCA section 1323(a) or the Wilderness
Act is a difficult one, it nonetheless appears that the later enacted sec-
tion 1323(a) - which provides that it applies "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law" - would be found to govern and thus to guar-
antee inholder access in national forest Wilderness areas. This result
comports with the legislative history that the court in Montana Wil-
derness Association found to favor the nationwide applicability of sec-
tion 1323. The court relied on a conference committee decision on a
post-ANILCA Wilderness bill that deleted an access provision from
the bill on the grounds that ANILCA section 1323(a) already pro-
vided such access in Wilderness areas outside of Alaska.73 Conse-
quently, ANILCA section 1323(a) appears to provide an access
guarantee applicable to Wilderness areas of national forests
nationwide.
Second, the court in Montana Wilderness Association left the ap-
plicability of ANILCA section 1323(b) outside of Alaska somewhat in
doubt because the court merely assumed arguendo that section
1323(b) applies only in Alaska.74 The Interior Board of Land Appeals
16 U.S.C. § 1134(a) (1982). The Attorney General construed section 5(a) of the Wil-
derness Act not to contain an absolute assurance of access; rather, the "landowner has
a right to access or exchange." Rights-of-Way Across Nat'l Forests, 43 Op. Att'y
Gen. 30, 50 (1980) (emphasis added).
73. See Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 655 F.2d at 957. The legislative history that
the Ninth Circuit found "decisive" in Montana Wilderness Association for the propo-
sition that ANILCA section 1323(a) applies nationwide also appears equally decisive
for the proposition that ANILCA section 1323(a) guarantees access into National
Forest System Wilderness areas. In considering the designation of Wilderness in na-
tional forests in Colorado, the House-Senate Conference Committee stated that special
access protections were not required because ANILCA section 1323(a) already guar-
anteed access in national forest Wilderness areas:
Section 7 of the Senate amendment contains a provision pertaining to access
to non-Federally owned lands within national forest wilderness areas in Col-
orado. The House bill has no such provision.
The conferees agreed to delete the section because similar language has
already passed Congress in Section 1323 of the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act.
H.R. REP. No. 1521, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1980).
At least one commentator, however, has expressed the view that ANILCA sec-
tion 1323(a) does not guarantee access in national forest Wilderness areas. See Com-
ment, Wilderness Values and Access Rights: Troubling Statutory Construction Brings
the Alaska Lands Act Into Play, 54 U. COLO. L. REv. 593, 612-14 (1983). The au-
thors believe that the commentator's "repeal by implication" argument is incorrect,
since ANILCA section 1323(a) repeals prior laws expressly (i.e., it applies
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law") and not by implication. See In re
Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 340 (2d Cir. 1981).
74. The court stated: "Subsection (b), therefore, is arguably limited by its terms
to Alaska, though we do not find it necessary to settle that issue here. Our considera-
tion of the scope of § 1323(a) proceeds under the assumption that § 1323(b) is limited
to Alaska." Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 655 F.2d at 954.
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("IBLA") has since held that section 1323(b) assures inholder access
across BLM lands nationwide.75 In Utah Wilderness Association, the
IBLA considered the access rights of Shell Oil Company across a
BLM-managed Wilderness study area in Utah to reach a landlocked
parcel that Shell had leased from the State of Utah for oil develop-
ment. The majority reasoned that, since the "legislative history [of
section 1323] clearly supports the conclusion that these two subsec-
tions have the same [geographical] scope" and since Montana Wilder-
ness Association held that section 1323(a) applies nationwide, section
1323(b) likewise applies to BLM lands nationwide. 76 The IBLA re-
jected the statutory argument that section 1323(b) applies only in
Alaska because it provides access across "public lands" and ANILCA
section 102(3) defines "public lands" as certain federal "land situated
in Alaska." Instead, the IBLA reasoned that "the subsection itself
defines the term 'public lands' as land 'managed by the Secretary
under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,'" and
that this latter definition should control to accord with the legislative
intent.77
A concurring opinion in Utah Wilderness Association would have
granted Shell's desired access on the separate ground that the decision
in Utah v. Andrus 78 requires access to state school trust lands.79 The
concurring opinion questioned whether the IBLA could ignore the
"public lands" definition of ANILCA section 102(3), and hesitated to
have the IBLA construe section 1323(b) expansively without judicial
guidance, "particularly where such an interpretation requires that we
ignore the plain meaning of the language used."80
While Utah Wilderness Association was appealed to the District
Court for the District of Utah, that court never issued an opinion re-
garding the nationwide applicability of ANILCA section 1323(b). 1
The district court dismissed the case as moot after Shell relinquished
the right-of-way. The BLM has taken the position that section
75. Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 91 Interior Dec. 165 (1984).
76. Id. at 172.
77. Id. at 169, 171-73. The IBLA's logic that ANILCA section 1323(b) supplies
its own definition of public lands appears to be undercut by the Supreme Court's re-
cent statement that the ANILCA section 102(3) definition of public lands applies to
ANILCA section 810 and "applies as well to the rest of the statutes." See Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 55 U.S.L.W. 4355, 4360, 4361 (March 24, 1987). If
this statement applies to ANILCA section 1323(b), the provision is limited to BLM-
managed public lands in Alaska since ANILCA section 102(3) defines public lands as
"land situated in Alaska." See 16 U.S.C. § 3102(3) (1982).
78. 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
79. Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 91 Interior Dec. at 177-79.
80. Id. at 176-77.
81. Utah Wilderness Ass'n v. Clark, No. C-84-0742J (D. Utah filed May 25,
1984).
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1323(b) applies on BLM lands nationwide and requires "that the ac-
cess necessary for the reasonable use and enjoyment of the non-Fed-
eral land [not] be denied. '" 82
V. TRANSPORTATION OR UTILITY SYSTEMS UNDER ANILCA
The absence of well-developed transportation and utility infra-
structures in Alaska was one reason why Congress provided specific
access guarantees in ANILCA. Congress also recognized that existing
law was cumbersome and inadequate for the evaluation of proposed
transportation or utility systems.8 3 Consequently, in ANILCA sec-
tions 1101 through 1107,84 Congress sought to establish mandatory
procedures for the uniform and expedited consideration of TUS pro-
posals. The paragraph below provides an overview of ANILCA sec-
tions 1101 through 1107 and is followed by a more detailed discussion
of the provisions as implemented in the 1986 regulations.
ANILCA section 1102 broadly defines the key term "transporta-
tion or utility system" to include facilities such as pipelines, transmis-
sion lines, roads, and airports that would cross a CSU or similar
conservation area in Alaska.8 5 When an applicant proposes a qualify-
ing TUS, ANILCA section 1104 requires that the applicant file a con-
solidated application form containing all the information required for
TUS approval by all relevant federal agencies, and prescribes sched-
ules for expedited agency decision-making and compliance with
NEPA.8 6 Substantive agency decision-making standards remain
82. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL pt. 2800.06 D (1985).
83. The ANILCA legislative history contained recognition that Alaska's "ex-
isting transportation and utility systems are in their embryonic stage of development."
H.R. REP. No. 97, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 235 (1979). Congress felt that
existing law was inadequate to ensure the approval of future transportation and utility
systems needed for Alaska's development:
[E]xisting law makes siting of roads and airports, particularly, but other
modes as well, very difficult if not impossible in wilderness areas, parks, wild
and scenic rivers, and wildlife refuges (in descending order of difficulty).
Specifically, in the case of parks and wilderness, no statutory law presently
permits the issuance of rights-of-way for general access. Secondly, existing
law makes for bad decisions from a land planning and environmental stand-
point because it is incremental in nature.
Id. at 237. One of the gaps in existing law was that "there is no applicable law provid-
ing for oil and gas pipelines across National Parks." S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 298 (1979). To remedy such inadequacies, Congress "adopted a [consolidated]
procedure for future siting of transportation facilities which supersedes rather than
supplements existing law." Id. at 246.
84. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3167 (1982). The operation of the TUS procedures also is
discussed in Sagalkin & Panitch, Mineral Development Under the Alaska Lands Act,
10 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 117, 133-41 (1981).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 3162(4) (1982).
86. Id. at § 3164.
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largely intact. Agency decisions may be appealed under ANILCA
section 1106 if: (1) an agency disapproves a given TUS in its discre-
tion;87 (2) an agency lacks authority to approve a particular TUS;88 or
(3) the TUS would cross a Wilderness area.89 In the first situation,
ANILCA section 1106(a) allows the applicant to appeal to the Presi-
dent, who has authority to approve the TUS.90 In the latter two situa-
tions, the TUS may be approved under ANILCA section 1106(b) if
the President recommends approval and the Congress adopts a joint
resolution of approval. 91
ANILCA section 1102(4)92 and the regulations 93 define the criti-
cal term "transportation or utility system" by type and location. The
term includes seven categories of systems where some portion of the
87. Id. at § 3166(a)(1)(B).
88. Id. at § 3166(b). The sources for substantive legal authority for agency ap-
proval of specific TUSs are described in note 108, infra.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 3166(b) (1982).
90. Id. at § 3166(a)(1)(B), (a)(2).
91. Id. at § 3166(b), (c).
92. See id. at § 3162(4) (1982). ANILCA section 1102(4) provides:
(4)(A) The term "transportation or utility system" means any type of sys-
tem described in subparagraph (B) if any portion of the route of the system
will be within any conservation system unit, national recreation area, or na-
tional conservation area in the State (and the system is not one that the
department or agency having jurisdiction over the unit or area is establishing
incident to its management of the unit or area).
(B) The types of systems to which subparagraph (A) applies are as follows:
(i) Canals, ditches, flumes, laterals, pipes, pipelines, tunnels, and other
systems for the transportation of water.
(ii) Pipelines and other systems for the transportation of liquids other
than water, including oil, natural gas, synthetic liquid and gaseous fuels,
and any refined product produced therefrom.
(iii) Pipelines, slurry and emulsion systems and conveyor belts for the
transportation of solid materials.
(iv) Systems for the transmission and distribution of electric energy.
(v) Systems for transmission or reception of radio, television, tele-
phone, telegraph, and other electronic signals, and other means of
communications.
(vi) Improved rights-of-way for snow machines, air cushion vehicles,
and other all-terrain vehicles.
(vii) Roads, highways, railroads, tunnels, tramways, airports, landing
strips, docks, and other systems of general transportation.
Any system described in this subparagraph includes such related structures
and facilities (both temporary and permanent) along the route of the system
as may be minimally necessary for the construction, operation, and mainte-
nance of the system. Such related structures and facilities shall be described
in the application required by section 1104, and shall be approved or disap-
proved in accordance with the procedures set forth in this title.
Id.
93. 43 C.F.R. § 36.2(p) (1986). Certain aspects of the TUS rules have been chal-
lenged in Trustees for Alaska v. United States Department of the Interior, No. A87-
055 (D. Alaska filed Feb. 9, 1987).
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system would cross a CSU or related federal areas. Under this defini-
tion, a system built wholly on nonfederal lands or on certain Forest
Service and BLM lands would not be subject to the TUS procedures.
The broad categories of qualified systems encompass nearly every
form of transportation, utility, and energy distribution methods, par-
ticularly because of the catch-all phrase that "other systems of general
transportation" 94 are included. The congressional choice of the word
"systems" to describe these rights-of-way implies that ANILCA Title
XI applies only to large-scale transportation and utility networks.
This may be misleading because a relatively small-scale facility (for
example, a road or landing strip) also may constitute a TUS.
If a proposed system meets the section 1102(4) definition of a
qualifying TUS, the TUS also includes related structures and facilities
along the route of the system that are necessary for its construction
and maintenance (for example, construction roads).95 While the pro-
posed rulemaking specifically excluded certain production and storage
facilities from the definition of "related structures and facilities," Inte-
rior deleted these exceptions from the final rulemaking. Instead, the
preamble states that the "test will be whether the related facility is
reasonably necessary to the operation of the TUS," and the rule de-
fines "related structures and facilities" as those that the applicant lists
on the consolidated application form.9 6
Proponents of a system or facility must accurately determine
whether the system or facility constitutes a TUS under ANILCA Title
XI and identify all components of the TUS. ANILCA section 1104(a)
ominously provides that no federal authorization for a TUS "shall
have any force or effect" unless the entire TUS complies with section
1104. 97 For example, if a person mistakenly obtains approval for a
right-of-way under legal authority other than ANILCA sections 1101
through 1107 and an opposing group or the government later discov-
ers that the right-of-way comes within the definition of a TUS, litiga-
tion may ensue to invalidate the earlier approval. The desirability of
such a punitive provision in a statutory scheme enacted for the benefit
94. 16 U.S.C. § 3162(4)(B)(vii) (1982). The legislative history suggests that "sys-
tems of general transportation" include "private and commercial transportation of
passengers and shipment of goods." S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 244
(1979).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 3162(4)(B) (1982).
96. 43 C.F.R. § 36.2(m) (1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 31,622, 31,630 (1986).
97. See 16 U.S.C. § 3164(2) (1982). ANILCA § 1104(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of applicable law, no action by any Federal
agency under applicable law with respect to the approval or disapproval of
the authorization, in whole or in part, of any transportation or utility system
shall have any force or effect unless the provisions of this section are com-
plied with.
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of TUS applicants can be questioned. Interior, however, has at-
tempted to forestall the potentially adverse consequences of this provi-
sion by urging TUS proponents to engage in preapplication meetings
with federal officials to seek agreement on the extent and components
of the TUS.9s
The unique Title XI procedures are triggered when an applicant
proposes a qualifying TUS. Instead of having to complete a number of
different agency forms and being subjected to a maze of federal
processing schedules, the TUS proponent need submit only a single
consolidated application form that the relevant agencies will consider
under the expedited procedures contained in ANILCA section 1104. 99
ANILCA section 1104(e) requires that the relevant agency complete
the NEPA environmental impact statement ("EIS") related to the
TUS within one year from the date the application is filed.I°° These
procedures govern not only the affected federal land managing agen-
cies, but also every federal agency that "has jurisdiction to grant any
98. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.3 (1986); 46 Fed. Reg. 29,759-29,760 (1981).
99. See 16 U.S.C. § 3164(a)-(c) (1982). In pertinent part, ANILCA section 1104
provides:
(b)(1) Within one hundred and eighty days after the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies,
shall jointly prescribe and publish a consolidated application form to be used
for applying for the approval of each type of transportation or utility system.
Each such application form shall be designed to elicit such information as
may be necessary to meet the requirements of this subchapter and the appli-
cable law with respect to the type of system concerned.
(2) For purposes of this section, the heads of all appropriate Federal agen-
cies, including the Secretary of Transportation, shall share decisionmaking
responsibility in the case of any transportation or utility system described in
section 3162(4)(B)(ii), (iii), or (vii) of this title; but with respect to any such
system for which he does not have programmatic responsibility, the Secre-
tary of Transportation shall provide to the other Federal agencies concerned
such planning and other assistance as may be appropriate.
(c) Each applicant for the approval of any transportation or utility system
shall file on the same day an application with each appropriate Federal
agency. The applicant shall utilize the consolidated form prescribed under
subsection (b) of this section for the type of transportation or utility system
concerned.
Id.
One may question whether the publication of one general consolidated application
form by the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and Transportation comports
with the intent of Congress, since ANILCA § 1104 appears to envision different and
specific application forms for each of the seven categories of TUSs. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 3164(b)(1) (1982) ("[the Secretaries] shall .. .publish a consolidated application
form ... for the approval of each type of transportation or utility system. Each appli-
cation form shall be designed to elicit such information ... with respect to the type of
system concerned."); id. at § 3164(c) ("The applicant shall utilize the consolidated
application form ... for the type of transportation or utility system concerned.").
100. 16 U.S.C. § 3164(e) (1982).
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authorization ... without which a transportation or utility system
cannot, in whole or in part, be established or operated."' 1 1 For exam-
ple, if a telecommunications facility on CSU lands requires the ap-
proval of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), the
TUS procedures likely apply to both Interior's approval of the site of
the facility and any FCC approval for operation of the facility. Thus,
the TUS procedures appear to provide "one-stop shopping" for all fed-
eral authorizations necessary to establish a TUS.
Four factors, however, may extend the one-year period for NEPA
compliance or diminish the cost savings offered by the "one-stop shop-
ping" approach. First, because ANILCA Title XI generally did not
supersede existing agency informational requirements, the consoli-
dated application form may not significantly reduce the TUS propo-
nent's reporting burden.102 Second, Title XI does not decrease
meaningfully the TUS proponent's information costs because the regu-
lations require that the proponent pay the "costs to the United States
of application processing" and the "reasonable administrative and
other costs of EIS preparation."'10 3 Third, by postponing the effective
submission date of the consolidated application form, Interior's regu-
lations allow several extensions of the one-year NEPA compliance
schedule.104 Finally, ANILCA section 1104(e) creates a "good cause"
101. 16 U.S.C. § 3162(1) (1982).
102. Congress seems to have contemplated the retention of existing agency infor-
mation requirements by providing in ANILCA section 1103 that "[e]xcept as specifi-
cally provided in this subchapter, applicable law shall apply with respect to the
authorization" of a TUS. See 16 U.S.C. § 3163 (1982). The rulemaking preamble also
suggests that ANILCA did not significantly reduce the applicant's reporting burden
51 Fed. Reg. 31,619, 31,623 (1986) ("each Federal agency has regulations and infor-
mational material which specifies the type of information that must be included in an
application").
103. 43 C.F.R. § 36.6(c) (1986). ANILCA section 1104(e) obliquely requires EIS
cost reimbursement by incorporating the provisions of section 304 of the FLPMA
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1734 (1982)) on cost reimbursement. See 16 U.S.C. § 3164(e)
(1982). The FLPMA cost recovery rules (codified at 43 C.F.R. 2803.1-1 (1986)) were
invalidated in Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1983). Interior has
proposed new FLPMA cost recovery rules. See 51 Fed. Reg. 26,836 (1986). In the
interim, "total costs will be presumed to be recoverable" for TUS EIS costs. 51 Fed.
Reg. 31,619, 31,623 (1986).
Even persons with a statutory guarantee of access under ANILCA section 1110
are not exempted "from paying reasonable fees" for processing the access application.
51 Fed. Reg. 31,619, 31,625 (1986). The regulations compel payment of administra-
tive costs by barring issuance of the TUS permit "until all fees and other charges have
been paid in accordance with applicable law." 43 C.F.R. § 36.9(a) (1986).
104. Although the date that the applicant files the consolidated application form
ordinarily starts the clock for the one year NEPA compliance period, the regulations
create two exceptions. First, although ANILCA section 1104(c) requires the form to
be filed with all affected federal agencies "on the same day," see 16 U.S.C. § 3164(c)
(1982), the regulations (1) allow a 15 calendar day grace period to file with all agencies
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exception permitting federal agencies to extend the time period for
NEPA compliance in certain situations. 105
Two different procedures for obtaining federal approval of a TUS
application exist. Interior's rules establish separate procedures for ap-
proval of: (1) a TUS that does not traverse a Wilderness area and for
which the agency has legal authority other than ANILCA Title XI to
approve the TUS; and (2) a TUS that crosses Wilderness lands or for
which there is no authority other than Title XI to approve the TUS. 106
When the TUS would be located outside a Wilderness area and
the relevant federal agencies have substantive legal authority to ap-
prove the TUS under "applicable law" (that is, authority other than
Title XI), ANILCA section 1104(g) directs the agencies to make a
final decision on the TUS within four months after publication of the
final EIS. 107 In this situation, ANILCA section 1104(g) likely does
not supersede the substantive law that ordinarily would be applied in
evaluating a similar proposal outside of Alaska. The provision only
supplements applicable law by forcing agencies to make additional
findings - findings that may provide grounds for litigation.108
and provide that the clock starts only when the applicant makes the last federal
agency filing; and (2) provide that, if the TUS applicant has not filed with all pertinent
federal agencies, the government must return the application to the TUS "applicant
without further action." 43 C.F.R. §§ 36.4(c), .5(b) (1986). Second, if the application
is incomplete and the TUS proponent does not provide requested information within
30 days, the government will process the application only if the TUS proponent agrees
that the official filing date becomes the "date of filing of the specific additional infor-
mation." 43 C.F.R. § 36.5(d)(1) (1986). Thus, the ANILCA section 1104 schedule
for federal decision-making can be upset unless the applicant carefully supplies all
pertinent information in the application and submits it to all relevant federal agencies
on the same day.
105. 16 U.S.C. § 3164(e) (1982). ANILCA section 1104(e) allows time extensions
for EIS preparation "for good cause," if the federal agency notifies the TUS applicant
and publishes the reasons justifying the extension in the Federal Register. Id.
106. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.7 (1986).
107. See 16 U.S.C. § 3164(g) (1982).
108. In this situation, ANILCA section 1104(g) provides that "each Federal
agency shall make a decision to approve or disapprove [the application], in accordance
with applicable law." See 16 U.S.C. § 3164(g) (1982). ANILCA section 1102(1) de-
fines "applicable law" as "any law of general applicability (other than this subchapter)
under which" a federal agency has jurisdiction to authorize a portion of a TUS. See
id. at § 3162(1). The rulemaking preamble identified the "applicable law" or substan-
tive law for granting rights-of-way across lands managed by Interior as including: (I)
for BLM lands, Title V of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1982 & Supp. III 1985);
30 U.S.C. § 185 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); (2) for Fish and Wildlife Service lands, 16
U.S.C. § 668dd (1982); 50 C.F.R. §§ 29.21-.29 (1986); and (3) for National Park Ser-
vice lands, 16 U.S.C. §§ 5, 79 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985); 23 U.S.C. § 317 (1982); 36
C.F.R pt. 14 (1986). See 51 Fed. Reg. 31,619, 31,620 (1986).
ANILCA section 1104(g)(2) appears only to supplement existing law by requir-
ing each relevant agency to consider and make findings on the following:
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When all relevant federal agencies agree on TUS approval, the
government will issue the TUS right-of-way without further levels of
review. 109 If an agency disapproves a TUS that it had the authority to
approve, ANILCA section 1106(a) allows the TUS applicant to appeal
to the President.110 This unusual presidential appeal provision directs
the President to approve the TUS if, within four months of the filing of
the appeal, the President concludes that: (1) the TUS would be in the
"public interest;" (2) the TUS would be compatible with the purposes
for which the particular CSU to be traversed was established; and (3)
no economically feasible and prudent alternative route for the TUS
exists.111
A separate set of procedures for evaluating a proposed TUS are
triggered when the agency lacks authority to approve a TUS or when
the TUS traverses Wilderness lands. 1 2 These procedures require pres-
idential and congressional approval of the TUS. First, each federal
(A) the need for, and economic feasibility of, the transportation or
utility system;
(B) alternative routes and modes of access, including a determination
with respect to whether there is any economically feasible and prudent alter-
native to the routing of the system through or within a conservation system
unit, national recreation area, or national conservation area and, if not,
whether there are alternative routes or modes which would result in fewer or
less severe adverse impacts upon the conservation system unit;
(C) the feasibility and impacts of including different transportation or
utility systems in the same area;
(D) short- and long-term social, economic, and environmental im-
pacts of national, State, or local significance, including impacts on fish and
wildlife and their habitat, and on rural, traditional lifestyles;
(0) the impacts, if any, on the national security interests of the United
States, that may result from approval or denial of the application for a trans-
portation or utility system;
(F) any impacts that would affect the purposes for which the Federal
unit or area concerned was established;
(G) measures which should be instituted to avoid or minimize nega-
tive impacts; and
(H) the short- and long-term public values which may be adversely
affected by approval of the transportation or utility system versus the short-
and long-term public benefits which may accrue from such approval.
16 U.S.C. § 3164(g)(2) (1982).
The sufficiency of these additional findings could be challenged in litigation, em-
ploying the substantial evidence test called for by ANILCA section 1104(g)(2). See
Sagalkin & Panitch, supra note 84, at 139-40.
109. See 16 U.S.C. § 3166(a)(1)(A) (1982).
110. Id. at § 3166(a)(l)(B).
111. Id. at § 3166(a)(2).
112. See id. at § 3166(b).
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agency concerned must submit to the President a notification tenta-
tively approving or disapproving the TUS and explaining the reasons
for the agency's decision. 113
Within four months of receiving the agency findings, the Presi-
dent must decide whether to recommend approval of the TUS to the
Congress. 114 If the President recommends TUS approval to the Con-
gress, ANILCA section 1106(c)(1) provides that the TUS shall be con-
sidered approved only if the Congress passes a joint resolution of
approval within 120 days of continuous session. 115 If the President
does not recommend approval, the applicant has a right of judicial
review. That right, however, may be illusory. Because the President's
review apparently lacks standards, his decision is virtually
unreviewable. 116
If an applicant obtains approval of the TUS, ANILCA sections
1106(c)(6) and 1107 direct the Secretaries of the Interior and Agricul-
ture to issue necessary rights-of-way over the lands they manage and
to strive to protect important natural resource values "to the maxi-
mum extent feasible."1 17 Approval of the TUS under any of these pro-
cedures apparently provides all necessary federal authorization for
TUS construction and operation. The stated purpose of the Title XI
provisions - to provide "a single comprehensive statutory authority
113. See id. at § 3166(b)(1). Additionally, ANILCA section 1105 requires an
agency that lacks authority to approve a particular TUS to:
make recommendations ... to grant such authorizations as may be neces-
sary to establish such system, in whole or in part, within the conservation
system unit concerned if [the agency] determines that -
(1) such system would be compatible with the purposes for which the
unit was established; and
(2) there is no economically feasible and prudent alternative route for
the system.
Id. at § 3165. Interior has defined an "economically feasible and prudent alternative"
as a route that is "able to attract capital to finance its construction" and that is pru-
dent from a cost-benefit perspective. 43 C.F.R. § 36.2(h) (1986). To be "compatible,"
the TUS must "not significantly interfere with.., the purposes for which the area was
established." 43 C.F.R. § 36.2(f) (1986).
114. 16 U.S.C. § 3166(b)(2) (1982).
115. See id. at § 3166(c)(1). If congressional approval is not received under this
joint resolution process, the TUS approval may require an Act of Congress.
116. Unlike the presidential approval standards of ANILCA section 1106(a) and
the agency recommendation standards of ANILCA section 1105, ANILCA section
1106(b) provides no standards to guide the President's decision. It merely states that
"the President shall decide whether or not the application for the system concerned
should be approved." Id. at § 3166(b)(2). Consequently, the absence of judicially
discoverable standards may render the President's denial decision unreviewable. See 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982).
117. See 16 U.S.C. § 3167(a)(1) (1982).
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for the approval or disapproval of applications for such systems"18 -
supports this conclusion.
VI. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TUS PROVISIONS AND THE
AccEss PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 1110(b) AND 1111
In many situations, the ANILCA TUS provisions and the sepa-
rate access provisions of ANILCA sections 1110(b) and 1111 may
both apply. Neither the ANILCA Title XI statutory language nor its
legislative history clarifies the intended relationship between the TUS
and separate access provisions, although Interior's regulations offer a
reasonable compromise. The uncertainty arises from conflicting
clauses that make each set of provisions controlling notwithstanding
any other law and from an imprecise definition of "applicable law."
A simple example illustrates this statutory conflict. Suppose that
an inholder within a Wilderness area desires to construct a road to his
inholding. Assuming that the inholder qualifies under section 1110(b),
and given that the road constitutes a TUS, the conflict is plain. There
are three possible interpretations of the manner in which the desired
access could be granted.
A. ANILCA Section 1110(b) Controls, and ANILCA Sections
1101 through 1107 Do Not Apply
Under one view, ANILCA section 1110(b) directs the relevant
agency to permit this "adequate and feasible access," "[n]ot-
withstanding any other provisions of" ANILCA or other law.1 19
Even though the road also constitutes a TUS under the definition in
ANILCA section 1102(4), compliance with the ANILCA section 1104
TUS procedures arguably is not required because ANILCA section
1104(a) supersedes only "applicable law" and ANILCA section
1110(b) is not "applicable law."1 20 Thus, one could argue that
ANILCA section 1110(b) is a self-contained provision for access, and
118. Id. at § 3161(c). The legislative history also reflects this purpose:
the reported bill makes it clear that Title XI provides a single comprehensive
statutory authority for all facets of such systems.
S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1979).
119. 16 U.S.C. § 3170(b) (1982).
120. See id. at § 3162(1). ANILCA section 1102(1) provides that "'applicable
law' means any law of general applicability (other than [Title XI of ANILCA]) under
which any Federal department or agency has jurisdiction to grant any authorization
... without which a transportation or utility system cannot, in whole or in part, be
established or operated." Id. Since Congress excluded all of Title XI of ANILCA
from the definition of "applicable law," and ANILCA sections 1104 and 1110(b) are
both part of Title XI, arguably ANILCA section 1104 does not supersede ANILCA
section 1110(b).
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that a qualified inholder need not comply with the ANILCA section
1104 procedures.
B. ANILCA Sections 1104 and 1110(b) Apply, But ANILCA
Sections 1105 and 1106 Do Not Apply
Alternatively, Title XI might be interpreted to guarantee access
to the ANILCA section 1110(b) inholder after procedural compliance
with ANILCA section 1104. Interior has adopted this interpreta-
tion.121 Two legal bases support Interior's view that the applicant
should comply with the procedures contained in ANILCA section
1104: (1) this view represents a proper exercise of agency discretion in
implementing an application and permit system for ANILCA section
1110(b) access rights; and (2) this view ensures compliance with the
section 1104(a) directive that no access authorization has "any force
or effect unless the provisions of this section are complied with."' 122
Once the applicant complies with section 1104, however, the agency
must then issue the ANILCA section 1110(b) access rather than sub-
mit the issue of Wilderness access to the President and Congress under
ANILCA sections 1105 and 1106.123 By directing the Secretary to
issue such access "[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of this Act,"
section 1110(b) expressly supersedes sections 1105 and 1106.
C. ANILCA Sections 1104 through 1106 Control, and There is
No ANILCA Section 1110(b) Access Guarantee
The third possible reading is that only the President and the Con-
gress can approve a road in a Wilderness area. ANILCA section
1106(b), in fact, directs that, where "any application for the approval
of a transportation or utility system ... proposes to ... traverse any
area within the National Wilderness Preservation System," only the
President and Congress, exercising their discretion under ANILCA
section 1106, may approve the TUS. 124 Under this reading, ANILCA
section 1104(g) allows a federal agency to approve the TUS only "in
accordance with applicable law." If "applicable law" excludes
ANILCA section 1110(b), the agency is not legally required to ap-
prove the construction of a road in a Wilderness area.1 25
121. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.10 (1986).
122. 16 U.S.C. § 3164(a) (1982); see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
123. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.10 (1986).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 3166(b)(1) (1982). In other words, the TUS provisions seem to
allow a TUS in a Wilderness area only after presidential and congressional approval.
125. ANILCA section 1104(g)(1) provides that "each Federal agency shall make a
decision to approve or disapprove [the proposed TUS] in accordance with applicable
law." Id. at § 3164(g)(1). The definition of "applicable law" precludes ANILCA sec-
tion 1110(b) from being a source of authority to approve the TUS. See supra note 120.
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Thus, three possible and conflicting interpretations exist. Resort-
ing to legislative history to undo this Gordian knot of conflicting inter-
pretations is of little avail because Congress drafted the TUS and
access guarantee provisions at different times and desired each set of
provisions to be comprehensive and controlling.1 26
Interior's regulations adopt the second, seemingly reasonable in-
terpretation.12 7 In essence, if an applicant seeks an ANILCA section
1110(b) access method that also constitutes a TUS, the regulations re-
quire that the applicant comply with the procedural elements of sec-
tion 1104, but obligate the federal agency to grant adequate access at
the agency level once the applicant so complies.12 8 This approach ful-
fills the congressional intent underlying ANILCA section 1110(b) to
provide a statutory assurance of adequate and feasible access. It also
fulfills the intent underlying ANILCA section 1104 that all TUS pro-
ponents comply with the section's procedures. Finally, this approach
provides for NEPA analysis to identify access alternatives that would
reduce environmental damage in federal CSUs. 1 29
The only potential source of "applicable law" to approve the TUS would be the Wil-
derness Act. But section 4(c) of that Act generally provides that there shall be "no
permanent road within any wilderness area," see 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1982), and sec-
tion 5(a) of that Act, as interpreted in the Civiletti opinion, provides the agency with
discretion to allow either access or a land exchange, see supra note 72. Accordingly,
"applicable law" would not require the agency to allow the construction of a road in a
wilderness area.
126. For example, the Senate report describes the TUS provisions as providing "a
single comprehensive statutory authority for the approval or disapproval of applica-
tions for all facets of such systems." S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 246
(1979). The same Senate report, however, states that ANILCA section 1110(b) "di-
rects the Secretary to grant the owner of an inholding such rights as are necessary to
assure adequate access to the inholding... [and the access right is not] limited by any
right of access granted by ... other statutory provisions." Id. at 248-49.
127. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.10 (1986).
128. The regulations require an applicant for an ANILCA section 1110(b) access
method to use the consolidated application form, and provide that the application
"shall be reviewed and- processed in accordance" with the expedited NEPA compli-
ance and agency decisionmaking procedures of 43 C.F.R. sections 36.5 and 36.6. 43
C.F.R. § 36.10(c), (d) (1986). As long as the applicant complies with ANILCA sec-
tion 1104, however, the regulations direct the federal agency to grant adequate and
feasible access to the ANILCA section 1110(b) inholder, without presidential and
congressional reviews. See id. at § 36.10(e).
129. Interior's interpretation of an ambiguous, and perhaps conflicting, statutory
mandate may be sustainable under decisions such as Citizens to Preserve Spencer
County v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 600 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
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VII. THE ANILCA AccEss AND TUS PROVISIONS: MODELS FOR
NATIONWIDE LEGISLATION?
Although the scope of most ANILCA provisions is limited to fed-
eral land in Alaska, 13° the need for access across federal lands exists in
other states as well. Are the ANILCA provisions unique to Alaska
needs, or are they appropriate models for legislative regulation of ac-
cess across federal lands in other states? The following paragraphs
explore this question. The authors conclude that the provisions guar-
anteeing access to inholdings offer the strongest case for general
applicability.
The public policy issue of the proper allocation of rights between
private landowners and federal land conservation interests has become
one of the most contentious and emotional issues in public land law.
On one hand, inolders typically assert that their private property
rights cannot be diminished simply because conservation-oriented fed-
eral lands surround their property. They claim that the government
must grant reasonable access and development rights. Conservation
interests, on the other hand, contend that stewardship over natural
resource values on federal lands must be paramount and that the gov-
ernment should constrain privileges of private access and development
where such privileges would conflict with federal conservation
objectives.
Although ANILCA primarily served the stewardship objective of
the conservation interests, the inholder interests prevailed on the issue
of specific access guarantees. Congress should broaden the scope of
this accommodation of divergent interests by providing a guarantee
for access to inholdings within the parks, wildlife refuges, and Wilder-
ness areas outside Alaska. The equitable claim that inholders should
not have their access restricted simply because the government has
designated a CSU around their property seems too compelling to
deny. In certain cases, this claim may even blossom into a right to
access to prevent a deprivation of property.' 3 '
Legislative ratification of inholders' access rights appears desira-
ble from a number of perspectives. From the private landowner's or
lessee's viewpoint, legislation remains the only sure means of confirm-
ing the entitlement to access that is so integral to economic property
rights. In the absence of legislation, the holding of the Civiletti opin-
ion, that no absolute guarantee of access across federal lands exists,
130. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982).
131. See Johnson v. United States, 479 F.2d 1383, 1390-91 (Ct. CI. 1973); Burdess
v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp.
995, 1011 (D. Utah 1979); Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891, 899-901 (Ct. CI.
1959).
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may prevail. From the federal land management perspective, clarify-
ing legislation could eliminate most troublesome property "taking" lit-
igation and illwill among CSU neighbors by creating a workable and
definite standard for access.
Admittedly, any statutory guarantee of inholder access may di-
minish the capability to protect the resource values of federal lands. If
the access guarantee is to be meaningful, it must go beyond the mini-
mum level of "sure you can walk to your property" and instead pro-
vide access commensurate with the level of economic development. In
many cases, such access may unavoidably degrade the natural re-
source values, or diminish the visiting public's psychic enjoyment, of
the federal lands; it undoubtedly will render more difficult the govern-
ment's job of managing those lands.
Two partial solutions, both suggested by the Alaska Lands Act,
can be offered for this difficult problem. First, the federal land man-
ager should have discretion to choose the access route that minimizes
environmental harm. Second, if the risk of damage resulting from
mandatory access remains unacceptably high, the government should
acquire the inholding by condemnation, negotiated purchase, or a land
exchange.
In sum, a statutory guarantee of inholder access across all catego-
ries of federal lands is appropriate. This nationwide guarantee of ac-
cess across federal lands likely should: (1) apply to property right
holders (for example, fee owners, lessees) within federal areas; (2)
guarantee access sufficient to support the intended private land use; (3)
establish an access-by-permit system; (4) provide the federal land man-
ager with discretion to dictate the access route least damaging to fed-
eral lands; and (5) require that the inholder bear all costs for access
construction and maintenance.
Although ANILCA's provisions concerning access to inholdings
appear to be beneficially transferable to states other than Alaska, other
ANILCA provisions seem to be unique to Alaska. For instance, the
need for the TUS procedures of ANILCA sections 1101 through 1107
is predicated on the extraordinary extent of CSU and other federal
land holdings in Alaska and on the immature development of Alaska's
transportation and utility networks. Though substantial federal land
holdings and the need for future rights-of-way through them do exist
in the western states, there does not appear to be a strong present justi-
fication for completely revamping procedures for obtaining permits for
rights-of-way outside Alaska.
Although wholesale nationwide application of the Alaska Lands
Act's TUS procedures is not recommended, this article suggests that
Congress establish uniform standards for the consideration of all
forms of rights-of-way. Disparate standards for approving rights-of-
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way across CSUs and illogical gaps in authority to approve particular
types of rights-of-way persist. For example, in most instances in the
National Park System, the NPS may approve a right-of-way only if it
finds that the right-of-way "is not incompatible with the public inter-
est."1 32 In the National Wildlife Refuge System, the right-of-way
must be "compatible with the major purposes"'133 of the National
Wildlife Refuge System unit. In the National Wilderness Preservation
System, the President must find that approval of the right-of-way will
"better serve the interests of the United States and the people thereof
than will its denial."' 34 In some cases, such as rights-of-way for oil
and gas pipelines and water conduits in the National Park System (ex-
cept for Yosemite and Sequoia National Parks),135 approval authority
appears to be totally lacking. 136
Objective reasons for these differing standards and gaps in au-
thority are not discernible. Why should the National Park and Wil-
derness Preservation Systems suffer a lesser degree of protection from
potentially damaging access under their more liberal public interest
standards - which allow consideration of non-conservation, eco-
nomic development interests 137 - than the National Wildlife Refuge
System under its "compatible [with the refuge] purposes" test? Why
should above-ground electrical transmission lines be aesthetically ac-
ceptable in national parks, while underground pipelines are not? Con-
tinuance of these historic anomalies does not appear justified.
To eliminate the gaps in statutory authority to approve certain
types of rights-of-way across CSU lands, this article recommends the
enactment of uniform procedures for the approval of any conceivable
right-of-way. This general authorization could parallel the exhaustive
lists of qualifying rights-of-way contained in ANILCA section
1102(4)(B) 138 and FLPMA section 501(a). 139
The appropriate substantive standard for approval of such rights-
of-way presents a more difficult issue. Several alternatives deserve leg-
islative consideration. One alternative would be to adopt the Alaska
Lands Act's approach to TUSs by preserving the approval standards
of current law and supplementing a generic standard only where no
132. 16 U.S.C. §§ 5, 79 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
133. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1)(B) (1982).
134. Id. at § 1133(d)(4) (1982).
135. 16 U.S.C. § 79 (Supp. III 1985).
136. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
137. Interior construes the "public interest" standard for rights-of-way under 16
U.S.C. section 79 as allowing consideration of "the public interest both in and out of
the park," including developmental benefits. City of San Francisco, 36 Interior Dec.
409, 410-13 (1908).
138. 16 U.S.C. § 3162(4)(B) (1982).
139. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1982).
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other approval authority exists.140 At the other end of the spectrum, a
new generic approval standard superseding current law could be en-
acted for CSUs nationwide. Candidates include the public interest test
currently applicable to national parks and Wilderness areas, the com-
patibility test currently applicable to wildlife refuges, or a "not incom-
patible with the management of a CSU" standard, which would
overcome burden of proof and philosophical incompatibility
problems. 141
The final issue is whether general legislation similar to ANILCA
section 1110(a) would be desirable outside of Alaska to open federal
lands to certain types of access without requiring a permit. Such legis-
lation would be premised on a notion of de minimis environmental
harm: there are certain minimally damaging access methods (for ex-
ample, airplanes, snowmachines, and horses) that should be author-
ized generally in CSUs and not be made subject to permit procedures
and the vagaries of administrative discretion. This premise, however,
would be inconsistent with the national off-road vehicle policy of Ex-
ecutive Order No. 11,644. Executive Order No. 11,644 prohibits the
use of most snowmobiles and airplanes within Wilderness areas and
establishes a presumption against authorization of such access meth-
ods in national parks and wildlife refuges. 142 Furthermore, while the
argument that unregulated access would not cause significant environ-
mental harm might hold true for the sparingly used and expansive
CSUs in Alaska, such may not be the case for the more intensively
used and smaller CSUs in states other than Alaska. 143
140. See 16 U.S.C. § 3166 (1982).
141. In other words, an affirmative finding that a right-of-way is "compatible" with
the purposes of a CSU may be more difficult to sustain than a finding that the right-of-
way "is not incompatible" with CSU objectives. Additionally, phrasing the standard
in terms of practical management considerations, instead of the purposes of the CSU,
could preclude per se incompatibility findings based on the language of the CSU stat-
ute, such as the argument that roads can never be compatible with Wilderness pur-
poses because a Wilderness area is defined as an area with "no permanent road." 16
U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1982).
142. Exec. Order No. 11,644, 3 C.F.R. 666 (1971-1975), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 app. at 510-11 (1982). Section 3(a)(4) of Executive Order No. 11,644 provides:
Areas and trails [for ORV use] shall not be located in officially designated
Wilderness Areas or Primitive Areas. Areas and trails shall be located in
areas of the National Park system, Natural Areas, or National Wildlife Ref-
uges and Game Ranges only if the respective agency head determines that
off-road vehicle use in such locations will not adversely affect their natural,
aesthetic, or scenic values.
Id. at § 3(a)(4).
143. The conservation and access problems raised by ORV use in CSUs outside
Alaska are illustrated in cases such as Coupland v. Morton, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,504 (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 1975), aff'd, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,507
(4th Cir. July 7, 1975).
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For the above reasons, a provision comparable to ANILCA sec-
tion 1110(a) should not be part of any national legislation on access
across federal lands. The better course of action outside of Alaska is
to continue applying the mandate of Executive Order No. 11,644 to
open or close areas to general off-road vehicle use depending on ex-
pected environmental consequences, and to add a statutory access
guarantee for CSU inholders who have no other form of adequate in-
gress and egress.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In response to several impediments to securing access across fed-
eral lands, Congress included in the Alaska Lands Act some of the
most important and innovative provisions on access and rights-of-way
yet enacted. In sections 1110(b) and 1323, ANILCA guarantees in-
holder access across CSUs in Alaska and the lands of the Forest Ser-
vice and the BLM. A similar provision guaranteeing such access
nationwide across all federal lands appears to be desirable. Respond-
ing to the immature stage of development of Alaska's transportation
and utility systems, ANILCA provides uniform procedures for ob-
taining approval of such systems that cross federal lands. Although a
wholesale application of similar procedures nationwide may be unwar-
ranted, the authors conclude that Congress should establish uniform
procedures and standards for the evaluation of all forms of rights-of-
way across federal lands. Until such time as Congress so responds,
Alaska may be the only state where the lament that "you can't get
there from here" does not have an element of truth.
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